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DESIGN FOR ERROR TOLERANCE
Jens Rasmussen
Riso National Laboratory, DK 4000 Roskilde, Denmark
An important aspect of the optimal design of computer-based
operator support systems is the sensitivity of such systems to op-
erator errors.
Faults and errors cannot be defined objectively by considering
the performance of humans or equipment in isolation.  They can
only be defined with reference to human intentions or expecta-
tions; they depend upon somebody's judgement of the specific
situation.  If system performance is judged below the accepted,
present standard, somebody will typically try to-back-track the
causal chain to find the causes.  How far back to seek is a rather
open question; generally, the search will stop when one or more
changes are found which are familiar and therefore acceptable as
explanations, and to which something can be done for correction.
A more fruitful point of view than to look for human errors as
causes of system failures is to consider "human errors" as in-
stances-, of man-machine or man-task misfits.  In case of system-
atic or frequent misfits, the cause can then typically be considered
a design error.  Occasional misfits are typically caused by vari-
ability on the part of the system or the man.
Human variability may excee(i the tolerance limits at the tails
of its normal distribution; occurrences which may very well have
causes external to the person such as troubles at home, a colleague
who asks for a match, or general work pressure.  Inappropriate
acts during attempts to adapt behaviour to the demands of a failed
system may be due to lack of training, inappropriate knowledge
etc., but may very well be acts to test reasonable but, as it turns
out, incorrect working hypotheses.
In general, human variability is an important ingredient in ad-
aptation and learning, and the ability to adapt to peculiarities in
system performance and optimize interaction is the very reason for
having people in a system.  In order to optimize performance, to
develop smooth and efficient skills, it is very important to have
opportunities to "cut corners", to perform trial and error experi-
ments, and human errors can in a way be considered as unsuccess-
ful experiments with unacceptable consequences.  Typically they
are only classified as human errors because they are performed in
an "unkind" work environment.  An unkind work environment is
then defined by the fact that it is not possible for a man to correct
the effects of inappropriate variations in performance before they
lead to unacceptable consequences.  This typically occurs because
he either cannot immediately observe the effects of-his "errors" or
because they are irreversible.  This is no new wisdom; already in
1905 Ernst Mach said: "Knowledge and error flow from the same
mental sources, only success can tell the one from the other".
In consequence, this means that human "errors" cannot be
avoided.  What can be avoided are the effects of human variability
if the systems can be designed so as to make effects-of unaccept-
able human actions observable and reversible.
Reversibility is largely a question of system properties;
whether the effect of an action can be compensated in due time
before damage has happened.  Observability, however, depends
very much on the human interpretation of the available informa-
tion, and this again depends on the way in which human activity is
controlled.  From a control point of view, three different levels of
human behaviour can be distinguished, the skill-, rule- and knowl-
edge-based levels (Rasmussen, 1983).  The manual skill is based
on automated, smooth and highly integrated behavioural patterns;
rule-based behaviour is goal-oriented, but controlled by know-how
and professional rules.  Only knowledge-based behaviour is con-
trolled by explicitly formulated goals.  During training in a
particular task, control moves from the knowledge- or rule-
based levels towards the skill-based control, as familiarity with
the work scenarios is developed.  An important point is that it is
not the control processes of the higher levels which are auto-
mated.  Automated manual skills are developing while they are
controlled and supervised at the higher levels.  When explicit
knowledge or rules are no longer needed for behavioural control
during normal work, they may eventually deteriorate.  With
respect to error observability, it is a problem at the skill- and
rule-based levels that the goals are not explicitly control-Ling
the activity.  This means that errors during performance may
only be evident at a very late stage an error in the use of a rec-
ipe may not manifest itself until you taste the cake; i.e. when
the product is present.
Early detection of the effect of one's own variability
(or of changes in system conditions) depends on an abil-
ity to monitor the process, i.e. on knowledge-based
monitoring based on understanding C)f the underlying
processes.  For error detection it may therefore be im-
portant that interface design serves to maintain knowl-
edge, even though high skill is developed.
Skill-, rule- and knowledge-based behaviour are not alter-
native human processes; they are categories of behavioural
control which are probably all active at all times.  During fa-
miliar work situations, when immediate activity is controlled by
know-how and automated subroutines, the conscious mind has
time left for other business which may be to plan the future, to
monitor the effects of past activities, or to speculate on private
troubles.  The degree to which people tend to use knowledge-
based functional reasoning to monitor their activities during
familiar work situations probably depends very much on one's
individual disposition, but the opportunity to do so certainly
also depends on the man-machine interface design.  It may sup-
port an operator during an abnormal risky plant disturbance to
have a symptom-based, computer-supported procedure, as long
as plant performance adheres to the designer's predictions and
the operator makes no mistakes.  However, these conditions
may not always be present, and then quite different kinds of
interface design are needed for knowledge-based monitoring
and "error" observation.
The conclusion of this discussion is that it is important to
make the process transparent for the operator and to design for
knowledge-based monitoring, even when rule-based, proce-
duralized operator performance is intended.  This is particularly
the case when modern information technology is used for deci-
sion support. @he operator then cooperates in his decision
making with the computer and the designer, and in order to be
able to perform a knowledge-based monitoring of the plant
response during the steps of a decision and control sequence,
the operator will need not only to understand the processes of
the plant, but also to know the intentions and design decisions
of the control system designer.
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